DNS is a crucial part of the Internet. However DNS traffic is usually not encrypted and can leak lots of interesting information and originally DNS also did not provide date integrity, making it vulnerable to DNS spoofing.
These days, improvements are being made to fix these problems. Data integrity is proved by DNSSEC and the privacy part is being tackled by the DNS Privacy project, proposing solutions like DNS-over-TLS (all data between resolver and client is encrypted) and QNAME minimisation (not sending the FQDN but only the relevant part to each DNS server when doing recursive resolving). More information about the DNS Privacy project can be found in this Fosdem 2018 talk.
There are basically 3 options for DNS on your client systems:
- You forward all requests to your ISP’s DNS servers (which is what is usually done by default).
- You forward all requests to a public global DNS service, like Cloudlfare’s 188.8.131.52, Quad9 or Google DNS.
- You set up your own DNS recursor which connects itself to authoritative DNS servers.
ISP’s default DNS servers
Quite often the problem with your ISP’s DNS servers, is that they don’t support DNSSEC and QNAME minmisation. There is an online test to check whether your DNS server does DNSSEC validation. To test whether QNAME minimisation is enabled for your current resolver, use this command:
$ dig +nodnssec +short TXT qnamemintest.internet.nl
(replace dig by kdig if you are using Knot’s DNS utils)
Some (mostly American) ISPs serve redirect pages when you enter an unexisting domain name and they often block hosts with content which is illegal in your country (child pornography, sites helping with copyright infringement, illegal gambling sites,…). In less democratic countries local DNS server are abused for censorship.
These might all be reasons in order to not to use your ISP’s DNS servers.
But at least in Europe, ISPs should be restricted by the GDPR to sell DNS data. And your ISP’s DNS servers prevent a single point of failure, a single point of data collection, and a single point of censorship. So there are advantages too.
Public global DNS services
The popular global public DNS services all support DNSSEC by default and you can connect to them using encrypted DNS-over-TLS. Some also do QNAME mimisation.
These public global DNS providers are often praised for their speed. You can find result of benchmarks of public DNS resolvers on dnsperf.com. You can also use namebench to benchmark different DNS servers . For example:
$ namebench 184.108.40.206 220.127.116.11 18.104.22.168 -x -O
You want your DNS resolver to be as close to you as possible, especially if your DNS server does not support EDNS Client Subnet (ECS). This is a method which allows a DNS recursor to send the subnet of the client to the authoritative DNS server. This is used by content delivery networks to provide you with the IP of the nearest server serving the requested content. Many privacy oriented DNS services do not support ECS, so the only information the authoritative DNS server has, is the location of your recursor. If that recursor is far away from you, this will lead to the client being sent to a far away server of the content delivery network, leading to much slower access to the content. For this reason, you should rather not use a DNS server in a foreign country, but use one which is as close as possible to your location. You can check how many hops a server is from you using the traceroute or mtr command, for example
$ mtr --report-wide 22.214.171.124
More information about this issue can be found in the blog post “Using Cloudflare’s 126.96.36.199 might lead to slower CDN performance” by Sajal Kayan.
Also for privacy reasons you would also prefer to have one in your own country, so that it’s not susceptible to legislation of a foreign country. Often, countries have a more relaxed legislation regarding spying on foreign connections.
Your own DNS recursor
Then there is the third alternative to using a global public DNS service or your ISP’s DNS servers: running your own local recursive DNS resolver, for example with Knot Resolver. If you DNS server is well configured, it will provide you with DNSSEC validation and QNAME minimisation. However this has a serious privacy disadvantage too because this will reveal your own IP to all authoritative servers you connect to. Furthermore connections to authoritative DNS servers currently are always unencrypted, so your ISP and anyone between you and the authoritative server can see your DNS queries.
Overview of public DNS servers
In case you have decided for whatever reason you do not want to use your ISP’s DNS servers and also don’t want to do recursion yourself, there are many public DNS recursors. On the dnsprivacy.org website you can also find a list of public DNS resolvers and experimental servers with support for DNS-over-TLS. I will review a few of the most important ones here.
Cloudflare‘s DNS service running on the 188.8.131.52 IP address appears to be the fastest in most cases. Unlike some other services, they do have a local server here in Brussels, which likely contributes to the great performance here. You can check which server you would be using by running this command:
$ dig +short CHAOS TXT id.server @184.108.40.206
Quad9, running on the 220.127.116.11 IP address, is a DNS service set up by a nonprofit organization supported by the Global Cyber Alliance, IBM and PCH together in collaboration with other security partners. Their main feature is that they block malicious hosts (like phishing sites), improving security for your devices. Like Cloudflare, Quad9 shares some anonymized data with their threat-intelligence partners for security analysis.
At the end of 2018, Quad9 had servers in 137 cities in 82 countries. Unfortunately there is no server in Belgium. Probably because of this, resolving of domains which DNS server is located in Belgium, is slower in the few tests I did. Because it also does not support ECS (yet), it might not forward you to the nearest content location. You can check with the same command as Cloudflare which DNS server of Quad9 is in use for your location:
$ dig +short CHAOS TXT id.server @18.104.22.168
Quad9 does DNSSEC validation, but at this moment does not appear to be supporting QNAME minimisation.
Google Public DNS, running on 22.214.171.124, appears to be the most public DNS service in use globally. According to SIDN (the registry maintaining the .nl domain), 15% of the requests come from Google’s public DNS servers. That’s probably because it’s around longer than many others (started in December 2009). Also systemd-resolved uses Google’s DNS as a fallback of there are no working default DNS servers set up. This is configured in /etc/systemd/resolved.conf.
Google supports ECS. The list of locations where it has servers can be found in the FAQ.
Google stores request logs a bit longer than some others, some even permanently. These days also more and more people distrust Google with their private data. While Google DNS does DNSSEC validation, just like Quad9 it does not appear to be doing QNAME minimisation.
OpenDNS was already launched in 2006 and was acquired by Cisco in 2015. They have been redirecting unexisting domains to a custom search page with advertisements, but stopped doing so in 2014. OpenDNS has optional filtering of adult domains and other unwanted content.
Which of all these options to choose, is a personal decision. Personally I think that running your own recursor on your own computer is a bad idea. All authoritative name servers will see your personal IP, and your unencrypted queries can be easily monitored by your ISP. I think this should only be considered if you are setting up a DNS server for a fairly large number of clients.
My own ISP does not support DNSSEC and QNAME minimisation. I think these two are crucial features to protect the user’s privacy and for this reason I prefer to use one of the public DNS services. I have set up Knot Resolver to forward DNS requests to Cloudflare’s DNS service over TLS. Not only does it support QNAME minimisation in addition to DNSSEC and DNS-over-TLS, it is fast and has a local server in Belgium. Combine this with the abuse.ch urlhaus RPZ file to add some protection from malicious domains. More details about this can be found in my previous blog post Secure and private DNS with Knot Resolver. I also use this set up on the network I manage at work.